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COMMENT
THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION AS APPLIED TO LANDLORDS'
REMEDIES AGAINST DELINQUENT TENANTS
Summary statutory proceedings' available to present day lessors afford
a speedy, but not necessarily complete, remedy against delinquent tenants.
At least one court has indicated that, while judgment for possession will be
granted, there is no certainty as to the existence or nature of an additional
remedy for past due rent.2 Since summary eviction after default in payment
of rent is a statutory remedy, the judgment is confined to the relief specific-
ally provided, which varies from state to state.3
It is proposed to consider, first, the various remedies landlords may
invoke against delinquent tenants; and, second, the possible applications
of the doctrine of election should resort to other types of actions seem ad-
visable after initial attempts have been made to enforce the lessors' rights.
Whether or not the numerous lessors who have chosen summary proceedings
to regain possession of their property have elected a remedy which prevents
any further action to collect the back rent, they have benefited immensely
from the use of these modem proceedings, at least in contrast to a fictitious
John Doe, living in the thirteenth century.
When Lord John Doe's tenant failed to pay his rent, the landlord's
remedy lay in an action upon a writ of customs and services,4 or in his
power to distrain certain enumerated goods, 5 which he held pending the
receipt of the amount owed. The former remedy was extremely slow and
cumbersome whereas, the latter, while easy to obtain, could be defeated
whenever the tenant denied his liability," Nor were the now commonplace
remedies of debt7 and indebitatus assunpsit available to Lord Doe to
1. See Spillner v. Guenther, 26 N.J. Misc. 159, 58 A.2d 540, 542 (Sup. Ct. 1948)
(landlord's action to disposess tenant of the leased premises in summary fashion); Gar-
rett v. Reid, 244 Ala. 254, 257, 13 So.2d 97, 100 (1943).
2. See Talley v. Mitchell, 138 Ga. 392, 397, 74 S.E. 465, 468 (1912).
3. E.g., AL4. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 967, 973 (1940) (restitution and costs); D.C.
CoDE § 11-735 (1940) (possession and incidentally rent); FLA. STAT. §§ 83.20, 83.25,
83.26 (1949) (possession and costs); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-1613, 3-1619 (Bums 1933)
(possession and damages for detention); MINN. STAT. §§ 566.03, 566.09 (Henderson
1949) (restitution and costs); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2845 (1939) (verdict includes
rent or damages); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9261 ('Williams 1934) (judgment for rent, in-
terest, and damages in addition to possession).
4. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISHI LAW 125 (2d ed. 1898) (a
writ of customs and services was similar to a proprietary action by writ of right).
5. 2 id. at 577.
6. 2 id. at 125.
7. 3 BL. COMM. *232 (debt was unavailable at common law for this purpose).
8. 11 GEo. 2, c. 19, § 14 (1738) (indebtitatus assumpsit was not available for
this purpose until the passage of the statute).
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enforce his claim for rent. Having arisen from a reservation in the grant of
an estate for years,9 the right to rent was not considered a contractual right
in any sense of the term.
The relationships involved in the use of land belonging to another in
exchange for a remuneration may not be strictly contractual in nature, but
the language in many of the cases treats the rights and liabilities arising
therefrom on the basis of contract law.' 0 And, although the landlord-tenant
concepts of necessity remain closely connected with the history of real
property law as it developed in England the trend in this country is toward
considering the modern lease as a business contract.'1 Rather than resulting
from any basic change in the law, this tendency to interpret leases as con-
tracts may be the logical consequence of an attempt on the part of the
courts to give effect to the intent of the parties, who have in most cases
adopted leases contractual in form, which the courts proceed so to construe.
In any event, the breach of a properly drawn lease-contract by a tenant
permits the landlord to bring an action for damages at law or to seek
rescission in equity in accordance with usual contractual principles. In
addition to these purely contractual remedies there may be open to him, as
methods of collection, an action in debt to collect a fixed amount due, 12
an action of covenant to collect what is owed on a sealed lease, '3 a remedy
in the form of quasi-contract for the reasonable value of the use and occu-
pation of the premises if the compensation is not fixed,' 4 or a statutory dis-
tress proceedings.' 5 If these remedies arc not satisfactory, the landlord may,
in some jurisdictions or under a specially worded lease, re-enter and take
possession in a peaceable manner.' In case the lessor wishes to regain
possession and cannot do so without the aid of the courts, he may resort
to ejectment17 or sumrmary proceedings.'8 Since he usually cannot be certain
9. AfSis, Assumpsit for Use and Occupation in LECTURES ON LEGAL IhsToRY
167 (1913); 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Op. cit. SUpra note 4, at 131; Williams, The
Incidence of Rent, 11 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1897).
10. See, e.g., Butler v. Maney, 146 Fla. 33, 36, 200 So. 226, 228 (1941) (contract
or agreement creates the relationship); Hinsdale v. McCune, 135 Iowa 682, 684, 113
N.W. 478 (1907) (lease governed by same rules as other contracts); Dutton v. Dutton,
122 Kan. 640, 253 (Pac. 553, 554 (1927) (relation existing is contractual); Jackson v.
Pepper Gas. Co., 280 Ky. 226, 133 S.\V.2d 91, 93 (1939) (lease a bilateral contract
with mutual promises); Israclson v. Wollenbert, 63 Misc. 293, 116 N.Y. Sopp. 626,
627 (Sup. Ct. 1909) (essentials of contract-offer and acceptance-must be present);
McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N.Y. 400, 65 N.E. 208, 210 (1902) (contract to pay
money in installments). But see Dc Vore v. Lee, 158 Fla. 608, 610, 30 So.2d 924, 925(1947) (lease a conveyance of a portion of an estate).
11. See Bennett, The Modern Lease, 16 rEXAs L. REv. 47 (1937); 6 U. or Ci.
L. REV. 505 (1939). But see Note, 19 NoIRE DAIE LAw. 370 (1944).
12. 3 BL. COMM. *154.
13. 2 McAD4NM, LANDLORD AND TENANT 1191 (5th cd., Anbcrt, 1934).
14. 2 id. at 1193.
15. See Benedict v. Gress Mfg. Co., 101 Fla. 1359, 1360, 134 So. 66 (1931)
(attachment and sale of tenant's goods).
16. Markley v. Smith, 301 Mass. 64, 16 N.E.2d 20 (1938).
17. See Davis v. Robinson, 374 Ill. 553, 555, 30 N.E.2d 52, 54 (1940) (cjectnicnt
is an action at law to try title as well as to gain possession).
18. See note 1 supra.
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of the outcome of his action, he naturally is concerned as to whether he is
making a final election of remedy at the outset.
If an individual desires to enforce a right and has at a given time two
or more possible remedies dependent on inconsistent positions, he must
make a choice between them. 19 As has been stated in a much cited Florida
ease:20 "Either remedy could have been adopted, but not both, for the
reason that to do so would assert inconsistent relations between the parties
with reference to the property." Whether notice to the other party, the
institution of a suit or the prosecution to judgment is the point of final
election is not entirely settled.21 It is generally agreed, however, that the
choice of an inappropriate remedy does not create an estoppel so as'to pre-
vent the later pursuance of a usable remedy. 22
The doctrine of election is referred to in similarly broad terms no matter
what the factual situation, but difficulties arise in treating specific remedies,
and especially in the application of the doctrine to actual controversies.
The inconsistency between the rescission of a lease and the affirmance of
it has been considered to be the basis of a general rule necessitating a choice
between the two positions.23 Although the election between an action for
damages based on the existence of a lease and one for cancellation of the
instrument is usually irrevocable, the position of the lessor who follows
another course may be less clear.
Suppose a landlord decides to sue for past-due rent and brings an action
in debt or a suit to recover under quasi-contract for use and occupation. If
the suit results in a satisfied judgment, the lessor's remedy is complete.
If not, in order to decide what further course lie may pursue, it is necessary
to analyze the position he has taken thus far. If he has brought an action
based on the existence of a contract, he cannot bring an action to cancel the
instrument. The action he brought was one based on a contract, either ex-
press or implied; therefore, he probably could not now bring an action in
equity for rescission. But, the acquisition of a money judgment in such a
proceeding does not preclude remedy by distress to collect the amount
owed 24
19. Wake Development Co. v. Auburn-Fuller Co., 71 F.2d 702 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub norn. Cord v. McFie, 293 U.S. 592 (1934); Williams v. Pennsylvania Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 6 F.2d 322 (S.D. Fla. 1925); American Process Co. v. Florida White
Pressed Brick Co., 56 Fla. 116, 47 So. 942 (1908); Kearney Milling & Elevator Co. v.
Union Pac. Ry., 97 Iowa 719, 66 N.W. 1059 (1896).
20. American Process Co. v. Florida White Pressed Brick Co., supra note 19 at
123, 47 So. at 944.
21. Reade v. Brooks, 174 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1949) (notice); Karapetian v. Carolan,
83 Cal. App.2d 344, 188 P.2d 809 (1948) (not notice); Kent v. Sutker, 40 So.2d 145
(Fla. 1949) (institution of suit not conclusive); Pennsylvania Co. v. Harr, 320 Pa. 523,
183 At. 37 (1936) (mater of reliance and estoppel).
22: Dickinson v. Electric Corp., 10 Cal.App.2d 207, 51 P.2d 205 (1935); Zim-
merman v. Robinson & Co., 128 Iowa 72, 102 N.W. 814 (1905); Snow v. Alley, 156
Mass. 19S, 30 N.E. 691 (1892).
23. See Karapetian v. Carolan, S; Ca].App.2d 344, 347, 188 P.2d 809, 811 (1948).
24. In re Barnhart, 4 F.2d 269. (M.D. Pa. 1925).
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One of Lord John Doe's remedies lay in his right to seize and hold
property found on the premises until the delinquent tenant paid his rent
and redeemed the goods.25 This remedy by distraint has been described
as a proceeding in rem in a recent case denying the existence of the remedy to
a present day landlord. ' The common law remedy of distress has been
considered to be abolished in some jurisdictions by the institution of statu-
tory proceedings in unlawful detainer37 Other states, 8 including Florida,-
have an additional provision for distress, which amounts to the enforcement
of a lien against the tenant's goods by a sheriff's sale.30 The only issue in-
volved is the amount of rent owing, " and the foreclosure of the lien in this
fashion is not inconsistent with securing an execution based on a money
judgment. Of course, satisfaction of either would prevent pursuance of the
other. 2
Instead of any of the actions thus far discussed the landlord. may wish
to consider unlawftd detainer,33 a posscssory remedy. '4 It is purely a statu-
tory remedy, sunmmary in nature and unknown to the common law.," While
possession is universally given, the various legislatve enactments differ as
to whether rent, damages, or costs may be gained in addition.38 This sum-
mary proceeding has been variously described as an action based on con-
tract, 7 one arising from the breach of a contract, an action sounding in
tort, 9 and as a statutory substitute for ejectment.40 While not primarily a
remedy for the collection of rent, it has been referred to in that sense since
the tenant is apt to pay the arrears to protect his possession upon the
bringing of summary proceedings. 41 In that way it may prove to be a useful
method of enforcing payment of rent due.42
Aside from the effectiveness of pressure on the tenant to pay rent, con-
sideration should be given to the nature of the remedy of unlawful detainer
to determine whether it is inconsistent with the other possible remedies of
25. See Standish v. Moldawan, 93 N.1l. 204, 37 A.2d 788, 789 (1944).
26. Ibid.
27. See Welch v. Ashby, 88 Mo. App. 400, 404 (1901).
28. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 61.401-61.407 (1933); TEx. SFAT., RV\. Civ. art. 5227
(1948).
29. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.11-83.19 (1949).
30. See Benedict v. Gress Mfg. Co., 101 Fla. 1359, 1360, 134 So. 66 (1931).
31. Ibid.
32. Cf. Pickler v. Lanphere, 209 Iowa 910, 227 N.W. 526 (1929).
33. See note I supra.
34. See D'Amico v. Riedel, 212 P.2d 52, 54 (Cal. 1950); Shipley v. Major, 44
A.2d 540, 541 (D.C. Nlunie. Ct. 1945); Reckard v. Ryan, 133 Ore. 108, 288 Pac. 1053,
1054 (1930); Hart v. Ferguson, 73 Okla. 293, 294, 176 Pac. 396 (1918).
35. See Farnow v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 64 Nev. 109. 121, 178 P.2d 371, 377
(1947); Yori v. Phenix, 38 Nev. 277, 281, 149 Pac. 180 (1915).
36. See note 3 suPra.
37. See Cline v. Smith, 205 Ark. 136, 167 S.W.2d 872, 873 (1943).
38. See Crawford v. Alexander, 5 Ind. T. 161, 82 S.W. 707, 708 (1904).
39. See Greenberg v. Koppelow, 76 Cal.App.2d 631, 634, 173 P.2d 821, 822
(1946).
40. See Shipley v. Major, 44 A.2d 540, 541 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1945).
41. 2 McADAM, LAN)LORD AND TENANT, OP. cit. Su/ra note 13, at 1171.
42. Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 10 lIAtv. L. REv. 71, 87 (1896).
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the landlord. The landlord-tenant relationship from which arise the actions
of distress or debt, for instance, is also prerequisite to an unlawful detainer
action. The difference in the effect of the judgment perhaps distinguishes
the actions most clearly, the judgment in the detainer action having the
effect of terminating the lessor-lessee relationship.48 Previous pursuance
by the landlord of a suit in assumpsit, 4" an action for rent,45 an action to
enforce his lien," or the taking of security for rent47 has been held not to
bar a subsequent summary proceeding for possession. Of course, if the land-
lord has been successful in his collection of the rent due, he cannot bring
a detainer action, the gist of which is non-payment.48  And, in the absence
of special provisions in the lease, courts will generally permit the tenant to
pay the rent, interest and costs and dismiss the landlord's action.4 9 If the
lessor brings his suit to a successful conclusion and receives a judgment for
possession, he generally is concluded from bringing any further action for
subsequently accruing rent. However, under a statute which does not pro-
vide for recovery of rent in the same proceeding, it is not entirely settled
whether he has elected a remedy which will prevent a subsequent recovery
of the rent accrued prior to the termination of the lease.
There would be no inconsistency in the regaining of possession and
the subsequent recovery of accrued rent if the lease were treated as a divisible
contract, each month's rent being the consideration for the lessee's use for
that period. Recovery of rent was permitted on that theory in an Illinois
case50 after a lease had been cancelled by court order, and it would seem
equally applicable to a situation in which the lease is terminated by bringing
of summary proceedings. Nor would it appear to be essential to treat the
lease strictly as a contract to reach this result. A Florida case, speaking in
terms of a lease as a conveyance, nevertheless said of the rent that the debt
becomes fixed from time to time as the lessee uses the property.5 1 Under
such an interpretation the termination of the relationship should not wipe
out a fixed liability. Although there would seem to be no legal justification
for holding that bringing an action in unlawful letainer precludes a later
action to collect the unpaid rent through the doctrine of election of rem-
edies, it is possible for specific factual situations to create a binding estoppel
against further action by a landlord.
Upon the bringing of his action in unlawful detainer, a landlord is
43. See St. Louis Biliposting Co. v. Stanton, 172 Mo. App. 40, 46, 154 S.W. 821,
825 (1913).
44. Schumann Piano Co. v. Mark, 208 Ill. 282, 70 N.E. 226 (1904).
45. Crittenden v. St. Hill, 34 Cal. App. 107, 166 Pac. 1016 (1917).
46. Swanson v. Olsen, 38 Idaho 24, 220 Pac. 407 (1923).
47. Toplitz v. Standard Co., 25 Cal. App. 575, 143 Pac. 52 (1914).
48. See Veal v. Jenkins, 58 Ga. App. 4, 197 S.E. 328 (1938).
49. Trans-Lux Radio City Corp. v. Service Parking Corp., 54 A.2d 144 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. 1947); accord, Davis & O'Connor Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 311 Mass. 401, 41 N.E. 2d
287 (1942).
50. Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Fishman, 323 111. App. 413, 55 N.E.2d 837 (1944).
51. See De Vore v. Lee, 158 Fla. 608, 610, 30 So.2d 924, 926 (1947).
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choosing to terminate the lease as of that time and will be unable to pursue
a further remedy based on the continued existence of the lease, in the
absence, of course, of special provisions in the document itself. From the
time of the termination of the lease, the further holding of the property
is considered to be tortious, 52 and, if the statute so provides, double rent
may be receivable for the period following the formal demand.5 Where
allowed, this double rent is generally deemed to be in the nature of a penalty
for intentionally withholding the premises from the person rightfully entitled
to it. As the bringing of summary proceedings is primarily to regain pos-
session, it is generally conceded that such an action is in no way incon-
sistent with an action in ejectment to settle the title to the property. 4
In conclusion, a present day lessor has numerous possible remedies to
enforce his rights. These actions are dependent on the existence of a land-
lord-tenant relationship, which frequently arises from a lease in the form
of a contract between the parties. A landlord may seek damages at law
for the breach of contract or bring debt or distress to collect on the obliga-
tion, all of which are in affirmance of the existing relationship and would
be inconsistent with an action to rescind the instrument. Most of the rem-
edies are not inconsistent with each other, however, and it would be en-
tirely possible to get to the stage of judgment in unlawful detainer, distress,
debt and ejectment without adopting inconsistent positions. Satisfaction
of the judgment in distress or debt would bar satisfaction of the unlawful
detainer decree in which possession is granted based on the failure to pay
the rent, now collected by suit, but would not necessarily bar the ejectment
action in which title as well as possession is in issue. The satisfaction of
the judgment in unlawful detainer should not bar the collection by distress
or debt of the amount already owing or the settling of questions of title in
the ejectment action. Nor should execution of the judgment in ejectment
bar the satisfaction of the judgments in distress or debt although there would
be no further need for carrying out the decree in unlawful detainer to gain
possession already granted by the ejectment decree.
Most of the distinctions just drawn are technical and impractical in
nature since debt and ejectment are regular law actions and take a long time
for completion, while distress and unlawful detainer, although actions in
law, are provided by statute to furnish speedy remedies to the landlord.
Resort to distress, if satisfied, would wipe out any basis for bringing unlawful
detainer. If a landlord could collect the rent easily by bringing distress in
this fashion, in those jurisdictions where permitted, and instead of so doing
brought unlawful detainer to gain possession, he might under the facts be
52. See Willis v. Harrell, 118 Ga. 906, 909, 45 S.E. 794, 795 (1903); O'Day v.
[lanes, 111 Ind. App. 617, 40 N.E.2d 366, 370 (1942).
53. Talley v. Mitchell, 138 Ga. 392, 74 S.E. 465 (1912); Willis v. Harrell, supra
note 52.
54. Hanover Estates v. Finkelstein, 194 Misc. 755, 86 N.Y.S.2d 316 (N.Y. Munic.
Ct. 1949); Warren v. Startsty, 199 Okla. 683, 189 P.2d 948 (1948); Testa v. Lally, 161
Pa. Super. 478, 55 A.2d 552 (1947).
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considered to be estopped from bringing an additional statutory remedy to
regain the amount owed. Except where the facts of the case create such
an estoppel, there should be no legal justification for denying a subsequent
law action for the accrued rent to a landlord who has regained possession
by means of unlawful detainer. Since a landlord has a right to the accrued
rent under the lease and a right given him by terms of the lease or by statute
to regain possession of the land if the rent is not paid when due, there
would seem to be no inconsistency in the enforcement of these separate
rights in the same or different actions. Thus, in contrast to the fictitious
John Doe of the thirteenth century, a lessor of the present time has avail-
able numerous remedies, most of which are cumulative.
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